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Abstract 
A new model of the development of temporal concepts is described that assumes that there 
are substantial changes in how children think about time in the early years. It is argued that 
there is a shift from understanding time in an event-dependent way to an event-independent 
understanding of time. Early in development, very young children are unable to think about 
locations in time independently of the events that occur at those locations.  It is only with 
development that children begin to have a proper grasp of the distinction between past, 
present, and future, and represent time as linear and unidirectional. The model assumes that 
although children aged 2 to 3 years may categorize events differently depending on whether 
they lie in the past or the future, they may not be able to understand that whether an event is 
in the past or future is something that changes as time passes and varies with temporal 
perspective. Around 4 to 5 years, children understand how causality operates in time, and can 
grasp the systematic relations that obtain between different locations in time, which provides 
the basis for acquiring the conventional clock and calendar system.  
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1. Introduction 
A basic distinction can be made between two ways in which time features in people’s 
mental lives: as a dimension of things that unfold in time, and as a framework within which 
those things can be located. Psychological studies of the former focus on people’s ability to 
process and represent information about the amount of time that events last for. However, 
events do not just have specific durations, they also have temporal locations, just as objects 
do not only have spatial extent, they also have spatial locations. Thus, we can talk about 
temporal frameworks – systems for representing temporal locations - in the same way as we 
can talk about spatial frameworks (McCormack & Hoerl, 1999). The most familiar temporal 
framework that we operate with is the conventional clock and calendar system. However, the 
clock and calendar system is mastered relatively late in development, meaning that in 
characterizing the acquisition of mature temporal cognition, we need to consider how 
children represent temporal locations before they master this system. Much existing 
developmental research on time has focused on children’s ability to process and represent 
duration information. In this paper, we will instead focus primarily on the development of the 
ability to locate events in time, and we make a preliminary attempt to provide a model of 
developmental changes in this ability. Before doing so, we briefly summarize some existing 
work on time in children. 
 1.1Time as a dimension: Processing duration 
It is clear that children, from an early age, are sensitive to how long events last for. A 
series of innovative studies of timing in infancy have demonstrated infants’ sensitivity to the 
duration of events and the developmental continuity of the processes involved in time 
perception (e.g., Brannon, Roussel, Meck, & Woldorff, 2004; Colombo & Richman, 2002; 
VanMarle & Wynn, 2006). Moreover, research with older children, much of which has been 
conducted by Sylvie Droit-Volet, has carefully charted developmental improvements in 
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sensitivity to duration and also identified some of the mechanisms that contribute to such 
improvements (for review, see Droit-Volet, 2013, 2016). However, as Droit-Volet has also 
argued, being sensitive to the duration of events, which is present even in infancy, is not the 
same thing as understanding that events have particular durations (Droit-Volet & Rattat, 
1999; Rattat & Droit-Volet, 2007). Sensitivity to durations can be manifested by children 
adjusting their behavior appropriately to the durations of events that they perceive and 
process. However, children can adjust their behavior appropriately to event duration without 
an explicit grasp of the idea that events have durations. Thus, we can ask when children 
possess the concept of duration itself.   
Historically, research on this issue was conducted within the Piagetian tradition 
(stemming from Piaget, 1969). Research in this tradition takes as its starting point the idea 
that having a notion of temporal duration is a matter of being able to coordinate the relations 
between the dimensions of time, speed, and distance in the movement of objects (what Piaget 
thought of as the Newtonian notion of time). Empirical work primarily focused on the nature 
of the errors that children made in their duration judgments that suggested a conflation of 
these dimensions. While this work undoubtedly highlighted some striking errors in children’s 
timing judgments, this tradition has generated little research interest since the 1980s. This is 
largely because researchers have come to reject some of the central tenets of this approach. 
Fully coordinating the dimensions of speed, distance, and time is a complex achievement, and 
even 8- to 12-year-olds can struggle to make accurate judgments of duration when these 
dimensions are confounded (Richards, 1982; Siegler & Richards, 1979). It has therefore been 
argued that there must be more basic aspects of the mature notion of time that this approach 
neglects (Levin, 1982, 1992; Weist, 1989; Wilkening, 1982). Moreover, the idea that we can 
measure children’s notion of time primarily by looking at the accuracy of their duration 
judgments, as is assumed in the Piagetian approach, also faces the problem that even the 
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duration judgments of adults can be affected by irrelevant stimulus dimensions (for a recent 
review, see Matthews & Meck, 2016), whilst, at the same time, even relatively young 
children can make some judgments of duration, arguably without relying on the sort of 
complex inferential processes highlighted within the Piagetian tradition (Droit-Volet, 2002, 
2013; Droit-Volet & Coull, 2016).  
Weist (1989) has spoken of a “Piagetian void” that this approach leaves, even setting 
aside other problems it faces, because it has little to say about early childhood. It is this void 
that we hope to make some initial steps to fill, and we think the void is not just one regarding 
the early years, but also a void regarding central aspects of temporal cognition and their 
development. The Piagetian tradition focuses on time as a dimension of events – i.e., as 
lasting for a duration of a specific magnitude – with this approach trying to identify when 
children can separate out this dimension from other stimulus dimensions. Although the 
Piagetian approach has largely been discarded, recent research has retained this focus on time 
as a dimension. For instance, a central question in recent research on temporal representation 
has been whether children can make systematic mappings between temporal duration and 
other dimensions (Lourenco & Longo, 2010; Srinivasan & Carey, 2010). And, as mentioned 
above, most of the developmental research on time has continued to concentrate on changes 
in the accuracy with which children make judgments about duration. While these issues are 
clearly fundamental ones, here we want to emphasize the other, equally important, way in 
which time features in cognition. As we have already pointed out, time is also used as a 
framework insofar as events are located within time (McCormack & Hoerl, 1999): adults 
think of events as positioned somewhere in the past, present, or future and also as having 
locations in time relative to each other, with there being systematic before-and-after relations 
between these locations. We take it to be a crucial, but underexplored, developmental 
6 
 
question whether children operate with the same sort of temporal framework as adults, or 
whether there are more developmentally basic ways of representing the locations of events.  
While we will be focusing on children’s temporal frameworks, we also acknowledge 
that the question framed above and addressed by Piaget – i.e., when do children have a 
concept of duration – remains an important question. Moreover, introducing the issue of the 
acquisition of a mature temporal framework raises a further question of how this 
developmental process is linked to the acquisition of a concept of duration. Are these 
separable developmental achievements, or are they linked in important ways? Part of the 
power of our conventional temporal framework, the clock and calendar system, is that it deals 
both with duration and with temporal location: e.g., days, weeks, and years last for a certain 
duration, but, by assigning a time and date to an event, its time of occurrence is also located 
relative to other times. Thus, mature temporal cognition integrates both these aspects of time. 
We will return to the issue of how this is achieved developmentally towards the end of the 
paper.  
1.2 What are the properties of mature temporal cognition?  
There are some fundamental questions about the way children think about time that we do 
not as yet have the answers for. For example, we do not know whether in locating events in 
time, children make use of the basic distinction between past, present, and future that adults 
operate with. This lack of knowledge stems from both a methodological and a theoretical gap 
in the literature on cognitive development. With regard to methodology, unlike in some areas 
of developmental psychology, there is no agreed set of tasks that are used to tap children’s 
temporal concepts. This methodological gap stems at least in part from the theoretical gap: 
there is no agreed theoretical approach that actually specifies the core features of mature 
temporal understanding from which such tasks might be derived. For this reason, we start by 
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outlining three core features of adults’ mature concept of time that will shape our discussion 
of the developmental issues.  
(i) Time is represented as linear and unidirectional. A mature temporal framework 
locates events on a time line stretching back into the past and forward into the 
future, with each location on the line being unique and non-reoccurring. This time 
line has a direction in so far as events successively become present in the future 
direction, as expressed in the idea of the ‘flow’ or ‘passage’ of time.  
(ii) Time is unified. A single time line is used to represent temporal locations, and, as 
a result of this, every point in time stands in a systematic before/after relation to 
every other point in time. Transitivity holds between these relations: if a point in 
time A is before B and B is before C, then A is also before C.  
(iii) Time is event independent. Although time is populated by events, adults are able 
to think of points in time independently of the particular events that occur at them. 
Being able to distinguish between a point in time and any events that might occur 
at that point is an important aspect of mature temporal cognition. This aspect of 
temporal cognition is most clearly embodied in the clock and calendar system, 
which can be used to specify any point in time without making reference to any 
events that have occurred or might occur at that temporal location. However, we 
are not claiming that children only have this way of thinking about time once they 
have mastered the clock and calendar system. Rather this way of thinking about 
time is likely to be developmental prerequisite to being able to begin to learn such 
a system, and may be intact long before children master it (which they only do 
relatively late in development).  
Note that our aim here is to characterize features of everyday thinking about time. 
Science, e.g. in the form of the theory of relativity, provides a somewhat more complex 
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picture of the nature of reality itself, which reveals some of the assumptions listed above to 
be in need of qualification. Similarly, some philosophers working on the metaphysics of time 
question the extent to which some of the assumptions we have listed correctly reflect the 
nature of time itself, or are ultimately illusory. (On both of these issues, see, e.g., Dainton, 
2010.) However, we take it as fairly uncontroversial that the descriptions given above capture 
three core features of the way in which we do in fact think of or speak about time in ordinary, 
everyday contexts. The purpose of specifying these core features is to provide a template 
against which to compare children’s ways of thinking about and representing time: we can 
ask at what point in development children possess a notion of time that has these features, 
and raise the possibility that early in development the way in which children represent time 
may lack one or more of them. That is, it is possible that young children do not think of time 
as linear and unidirectional, do not have a unified way of representing the temporal locations 
of events, and cannot think of time in an event-independent way.  
1.3 Temporal perspective-taking: A hallmark of mature temporal cognition.  
Before describing our developmental model, we want to further elaborate the properties of 
the type of mature temporal cognition that we take to be the endpoint of development. In the 
previous section, we outlined the features of the notion of time that we wish to focus on. 
Here, we want to stress that a hallmark of possessing such a notion is the ability to engage in 
what can be termed temporal perspective taking, an ability that we will now describe.  
Part of what it is to possess a linear and unidirectional notion of time is to understand that 
what points in time are in the past, present, and future is not fixed. Rather, it changes 
systematically as time goes on. That is, for any ordered set of times A, B, and C that have 
now passed, there was a point in time at which what was to happen at A, B, and C was still in 
the future. Similarly, from the perspective in time at which A has just passed, A is in the past 
whereas B and C are still in the future and so on. One way to describe this is to say that a 
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mature notion of time supports a type of temporal perspective-taking that allows one to 
consider which times are in the past and which in future from points in time other than the 
point one currently occupies (e.g., from the temporal perspective of yesterday, today was still 
in the future, but today will be in the past from the temporal perspective of tomorrow).  
The idea that temporal perspective-taking is a hallmark of a mature notion of time is not 
new, and has been put forward by other theorists (Cromer, 1971; Harner, 1982; Weist, 1989; 
see also McCormack, 2014; McCormack & Hoerl, 1999), but we want to emphasize here a 
particular crucial aspect of temporal perspective-taking, namely that because time is 
understood as unidirectional, temporal perspective-taking must be grounded in a grasp of the 
asymmetry between past and future times. In people’s everyday understanding of time, there 
is a basic asymmetry between the past and the future: thinking about times as being “in the 
past” involves thinking of them in a quite different way that thinking about them as being “in 
the future”. One way to capture this asymmetry in the everyday understanding of time is in 
terms of the idea that facts about what happened in the past are not alterable, whereas facts 
about what will happen in the future are at least potentially alterable.1 We argue that mature 
temporal perspective-taking must involve putting to work this idea, and it is only because it 
has this element that it embodies a grasp of the unique directionality of time.  
 To make this clear, it is worth considering what is distinctive about temporal perspective-
taking that makes it a quite different sort of cognitive achievement from spatial perspective-
taking. In spatial perspective-taking, one may have to grasp that, for example, from this 
perspective in space the table is in front and the chair is behind one, whereas from another 
                                                          
1 We will be using this way of talking to characterize the kind of idea of the future as ‘open’ 
expressed in sentences like: “I was going to go to the cinema this evening, but now I think I 
might stay at home.” Again, note that this is meant to capture an aspect of our everyday 
thinking about time and events in time. Whether the future is genuinely different from the 
past in reality is a question on which there is a great deal of debate in philosophy, because it 
is of course equally as true of future times as of past ones that they can only ever contain one 
of these types of event or the other. (I either will go to the cinema, or I will stay at home). 
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perspective both of these are behind one. In doing so, of course, one must be able to 
distinguish in some way between “in front” and “behind”. However, although whether 
something is in front of or behind one has implications for one’s actions, there is nothing 
inherently different about the nature of those actual locations in space and indeed one could 
change whether something is in front of or behind one freely by moving to a different place. 
The temporal case is quite different. Whether something is in the past or in the future is not 
something that is in our power to determine, and which of two temporal locations is in the 
past and which is in the future is not something that can be reversed: we might say that in the 
everyday understanding of time there is something ontologically different about locations in 
the past and the future. Our suggestion is that temporal perspective-taking underpinned by a 
mature grasp of time must involve understanding this, which is why we describe it as 
perspective-taking that involves putting to work the idea that facts about what happened in 
the past are unalterable whereas facts about what will happen in the future are still potentially 
alterable. An important developmental question, therefore, is when children can engage in 
this sort of perspective-taking. 
We will finish this sub-section by making it clear exactly why we think this sort of 
temporal perspective-taking involves event-independent thought about time. Consider the 
case again of an ordered series of times A, B, and C that are now in the past. Someone 
capable of temporal perspective-taking understands that from the perspective of A, facts 
about events at B and C, which have now already taken place, were in fact still potentially 
alterable. Grasping this means that they understand that, from that perspective, it was still 
possible for things to unfold differently to how they actually did unfold. That is, they 
understand that B and C are slots in time that could have been filled with different events 
than the events that actually did happen. Grasping this means thinking about B and C in an 
event-independent way: as times that are separable from the events that actually did happen. 
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Note that in spelling things out in this way, we are making a strong connection between being 
able to think counterfactually and a mature notion of time. Moreover, someone who can think 
in this way can also understand that there may be events that happened at A that have left no 
observable traces in the present, sometimes taken to be crucial element of a proper 
understanding what it is for an event to be in the past (Hoerl, 2007). This is because they 
understand that while what happened at A may have left its traces on how things were at a 
subsequent time B, facts about what would happen subsequent to B were still alterable when 
B was present, so that things happening at or after B may have removed any such traces 
again.  
1.4 Culture and notions of time  
In proposing a developmental model of the acquisition of a notion of time that has the 
features we have emphasized, we need to briefly consider to what extent such a model is 
likely to capture something universal, rather than culture-specific. That is to say, are there 
cultures in which the features of mature temporal cognition that we have outlined are not in 
fact found? Probably the key controversial issue here is whether all cultures operate with a 
linear notion of time. We note that a linear notion of time, according to which temporal 
locations are represented as unique and non-recurring, could be instantiated in a number of 
different ways in the spatialized representations of time that are often referred to as “mental 
time lines” (Bender & Beller, 2014). In a number of cultures, including English-speaking 
Western cultures, time lines seem to have particular axes: time is spatialized either on the 
sagittal axis, with the past behind and the future in front relative to the body, or the 
transversal axis with the past to the left and future to the right. As is now well-established, 
other cultures spatialize times in different ways. In some instances, this involves a reversal of 
the assignment of past/future to portions of the sagittal or transversal axes (Fuhrman & 
Boroditsky, 2010; Nunez & Sweetser, 2006) but it may involve use of a different axis or 
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another spatial framework: Mandarin speakers make use of a vertical axis (Boroditsky, 
Fuhrman & McCormick, 2011), and Boroditsky and Gaby (2010) describe an Aboriginal 
tribe that represent time as running East to West.  
Despite these cross-cultural differences, all of these ways of spatializing time can be 
interpreted just as different ways of spatially instantiating a linear notion of time; what varies 
is the nature of the instantiation or in some instances the type of spatial metaphor used (e.g., 
the course of a river or the inclination of a landscape; see Bender & Beller, 2014). The 
trickier question is whether there are any cultures in which the notion of linearity itself is 
entirely absent. That is, are there are cultures in which people do not think of times as unique 
and non-recurrent? A culture that represented times only in a cyclical or repeating temporal 
framework would be of this sort. While some existing or past cultures clearly do/did 
emphasize cyclical or repeating patterns in time more than others (Aveni, 2000; Le Guen,  
Pool Balam, & Ildefonsa, 2012; Sinha & Gardenfors, 2014), what is highly controversial is 
whether this is/was the only notion of time available to them (Gell, 1992; Hassig, 2001). It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to properly address this question, though we note that looking 
at the characteristics of culturally specific spatial metaphors of time or calendar systems is 
not the only way to examine this issue. For example, Campbell (1997) has argued that a 
notion of time as linear is typically employed in constructing autobiographical narratives to 
describe events in one’s life (see also Hoerl & McCormack, 2005); if he is correct, then it 
seems unlikely that there is a culture that entirely lacks this mode of thinking about time (for 
further discussion, see McCormack, 2015).  
2. A developmental model of the acquisition of temporal concepts 
In this section, we propose a model of children’s acquisition of the notion of time we 
have described in Section 1.2, i.e., the notion of time that underpins the temporal framework 
used by adults to locate events. This model does not address all aspects of the acquisition of 
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temporal concepts; most notably it does not consider the acquisition of a concept of duration. 
The developmental endpoint that the model aims to capture is the notion of time that has the 
properties described in the previous subsection. Thus, the model holds that more 
developmentally primitive ways of thinking about time lack some of the core features of 
mature temporal cognition we have outlined, and that younger children are not capable of the 
type of temporal perspective-taking described in Section 1.3.  
One difficulty in proposing any comprehensive developmental model in this area is the 
lack of data from studies that have directly addressed key issues about children’s notion of 
time. In putting together our model, we have drawn on existing data from a variety of 
sources, including research on developmental psycholinguistics, studies of children’s 
memory, planning, and future thinking, and experiments specifically addressing particular 
aspects of children’s reasoning about time and about causation. It should be emphasized that 
we have used the principle of assuming only the minimal level of understanding necessary to 
explain what is currently known about children’s cognition at a specific age; this model is 
thus conservative in what abilities it ascribes to young children, and perhaps may prove to be 
unnecessarily conservative. Moreover, we recognize that there is still a large empirical gap to 
be filled; the account we provide is speculative and can only act as a springboard for further 
research in this area.  
Figure 1 shows diagrammatically the different developmental stages that we are 
proposing. The figure shows how children represent events or times that (objectively) are in 
the past and the future at each of four stages. Before describing each stage in detail, some 
general points can be made about the developmental shifts that the model tries to capture. 
First, children are assumed to shift from only being able to represent events [Stages (a) and 
(b)] to being able to represent points in time [Stages (c) and (d)]. That is, we are assuming 
that there is a shift from event-dependent to event-independent thought about time; our 
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suggestion is also that whether thought about time is event-independent is a matter of degree 
and that the model documents a series of changes towards fully event-independent thought 
about time. Second, it is only in Stages (c) and (d) that children are assumed to be able to 
think about the past and the future per se; at the early stages children treat past events 
differently compared to those in the future, but are not thinking of these events as located in a 
different time period, conceived of as such. Third, in Stages (a) and (b), time is not 
represented linearly and it is not assumed that children grasp the transitivity of the before-
and-after relations between events. Thus, at the early stages of development, children’s 
notions of time lack the core features that we have emphasized as characteristic of mature 
temporal concepts.  
This model is intended to capture key changes in the way children think about time that 
affect how they temporally locate events. Broadly speaking, children change from only being 
able to represent where in time an event is in terms of its position within an ordered repeated 
sequence of familiar events, to being able to assign events unique locations in time, and being 
able to think about whether those locations are currently in the past, present, or future. This 
emerging understanding then allows children to begin to acquire the conventional clock and 
calendar system. The first stage of our model begins when children are toddlers, starting to 
demonstrate in their actions that they are representing certain behavioral routines, and 
beginning to acquire language. Note that we do not discuss here how younger infants 
temporally locate events. Very young infants are sensitive to some temporal features of 
stimuli such as duration and rhythm, and this extends even to neonates (DeHevia, Izard, 
Coubart, Spelke & Streri, 2014; Nazzi, Bertoncini, & Mehler, 1998), but it is extremely 
difficult to examine how they locate events in time.  
2.1 Stage (a): Representations of Repeated Event Sequences (18-24 months) 
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A basic distinction that can be made between different types of ways of being oriented 
in time is in terms of whether they involve representations of repeatedly occurring 
cycles/sequences of events or representations of particular unique times (Campbell, 1995). 
Recurring event cycles or event sequences of various lengths are ubiquitous in everyday life, 
and there are reliable temporal relations between locations in such event cycles/sequences: 
for example, brushing of teeth happens after supper but before bedtime in the evening 
routine, Tuesday happens before Wednesday but after Monday in the weekly cycle of days, 
and summer happens after spring but before winter in the annual cycle. Recognizing where 
events happen within such repeated cycles or event sequences is very important, because it 
allows actions (e.g., the bedtime routine) to be carried out in the appropriate order and 
supports reliable prediction of what is going to happen next. Notably, though, mature thinkers 
can not only represent locations within such repeating event cycles/sequences in the right 
order, they can also think of any given occurrence of an event within a particular cycle or 
sequence as having a unique temporal location. To give two examples, although the action 
sequence in the bedtime routine is the same every day, today’s tooth brushing occurs at a 
particular time that is never revisited; similarly, Tuesday always comes before Wednesday 
but Tuesday 23rd August 2016 is also a unique point in time and in that respect differs from 
every other Tuesday. Mature thinkers can represent both these unique temporal locations 
alongside understanding where in repeated event cycle/sequence that type of event happens 
with respect to other events in the cycle/sequence.  
An assumption underpinning our model is that representing locations within repeated 
event cycles/sequences is more primitive than representing particular times. In fact, we 
believe that it is more primitive both ontogenetically and phylogenetically; specifically, we 
have argued elsewhere that there is no reason to assume that animals can think about 
particular times (Hoerl, 2008; McCormack, 2001; McCormack & Hoerl, 2011; see also 
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Campbell, 1995). Part of this argument hinges on what the function is of representing 
temporal locations as particular times; for many types of behavior what matters is knowing 
the appropriate order in which to carry out an action sequence, and knowing what to expect at 
any given point in a repeated event cycle/sequence. In fact, it is by no means straightforward 
to identify non-linguistic behavior that depends upon on a concept of times as unique and 
unrepeatable (Bennett, 1989; Campbell, 1995, 2006; McCormack & Hoerl, 2011).      
It is evident from relatively early in development that children are adept at learning 
repeated event sequences (reviewed by Nelson, 1996). Toddlers rapidly acquire behavioral 
expectations regarding repeated sequences (e.g., expecting to have a bath before sleep time), 
and parents typically try to shape toddlers’ behavior so that they will learn to carry out some 
action sequences in the appropriate order (e.g., we put on our socks before our shoes). In our 
model, we characterize this sensitivity as Stage (a), with the oval around the events intended 
to indicate the repeating nature of the sequences thus represented, in contrast to the way 
mature thinkers represent events as happening at unique, non-reoccurring locations on a time 
line.        
There are three important things to stress about the limitations we assume at this 
stage. First, we see no reason to posit that very young children who can represent locations 
with respect to repeated event sequences can think about those locations in an event 
independent way. For example, with respect to the bedtime routine, although there is a sense 
in which children know “when” their bath happens (after supper and before bed), there is 
nothing about this that compels us to assume that they can think about that temporal location 
as anything other than the point at which bath time happens. In this sense, very young 
children need not be thinking about times per se, but rather their thought is restricted to 
events that fill time. It is in this strong sense that we assume that earliest notions of time are 
event-dependent. Second, if all that very young children are able to do is represent and orient 
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themselves within repeated event sequences, there is no reason to believe that they can think 
about events as located in the past or in the future. A key part of what it is to represent an 
event as in the past it to represent it as happening at a particular time that can never be 
revisited. By definition, if children can only represent repeated event sequences, they will not 
be able to represent events as having happened at a time that can never be revisited. They will 
have no way of thinking of yesterday’s bath time as different from today’s or tomorrow’s 
bath time: in all these instances, bath time is represented just in terms of where it falls relative 
to other events in the bedtime event sequence.  
Although we believe this is the case, it should be stressed that in order for children to 
make use of representations of repeated event sequences, they need to be able to know where 
they are within an unfolding sequences. That is, they need to be able to use their 
representation to orient themselves in some way so that they have expectations about what 
will happen next (e.g., putting on of pyjamas happens next), and can assume that events that 
have already happened are now over (e.g., once pyjamas are on, it would be very surprising 
to be given a bath). One way of capturing this is by saying that, at this stage, children need to 
be capable of representing some events as “completed” and some events as “yet to come”. 
Importantly, though, orienting themselves with respect to events in this way is not the same 
thing as thinking of events as being located in a past or future time period: in thinking in this 
way, children are thinking about the status of events (completed/not completed) rather than 
the location of points in time (past/future).  
Finally, it should be pointed out that if children orient themselves only with respect to 
repeated event sequences, there is no reason to assume that they have what we have termed a 
unified way of representing time. That is, they have no single way of representing any given 
location in time. For example, they may be sensitive to the fact that having a bath happens 
before going to bed, or that they get into the car before arriving at nursery, but may have no 
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way of thinking about how the daily event of getting into the car is related to the event of 
having a bath. Thus, although Figure 1 (a) shows an ordered sequence of events, this should 
be interpreted as representing a single type of event sequence; there is no reason to assume 
that very young children can systematically relate ordered sequences to each other.  
We speculate that Stage (a) describes children’s temporal representations for 
approximately the first 18-24 months of life. It should be noted, though, that toward the end 
of this period some children begin to use the past tense for the first time (for examples, see 
Shirai & Andersen, 1995; Shirai & Miyata, 2006; Weist, 1989). The issue then, is how we 
should interpret early use of the past tense, and whether this early use suggests that very 
young children do not have the conceptual limitations that we are proposing here. 
Historically, this has been a highly controversial issue (Antinucci & Miller, 1976; Bronckart 
& Sinclair, 1973; Weist, 1989, 2014), and it is beyond the scope of this paper to summarize 
the developmental psycholinguistics debate. Detailed analyses suggest that children’s first 
uses of the past tense (Sachs, 1983; Shirai & Miyata, 2006) are to the immediate rather than 
the remote past, consistent with the idea that very young children’s first use of the past tense 
is to mark something about the nature of the events themselves (i.e., that they are 
completed).2 In suggesting this, we are not claiming that these very young children cannot 
represent anything except the here-and-now. We are assuming that young children have the 
sort of representational capacities widely attributed to them in the post-Piagetian era of 
cognitive developmental psychology as demonstrated, e.g., by studies of deferred imitation of 
event sequences (Bauer, Hertsgaard, & Dow, 1994; Bauer & Wewerka, 1995; Meltzoff, 
1995) or by the fact that children of this age will refer to absent objects or people (Sachs, 
                                                          
2 Note that we are not suggesting here that very young children only use the past tense for 
actions that have a natural end-point or point of achievement. Actions that are not of this 
nature can still be thought of as completed. 
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1983). These capacities, though, do not demonstrate that they can think of events as being 
non-current, but located at another time, in the past. 
2.2 Stage (b): Event-based time (2-3 years) 
At this next stage, we assume that children can do more than simply represent 
locations with respect to repeated event sequences. Between two and three years of age, 
children typically use both past and future tense and start to use temporal adverbs to make 
reference to temporally distant events. Studies of children’s autobiographical memory 
consistently suggest that children of this age can provide at least some details of remote past 
events, and can use the past tense to do so (e.g., Peterson, 2002; Peterson & Rideout, 1998; 
Weist & Zevenbergen, 2008). By the time children are three, they can provide (albeit often 
sparse) information about events due to occur at some point in the future using the 
appropriate tense (e.g., Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011; Quon & 
Atance, 2010). Even if children’s descriptions of past and future events are often both highly 
scaffolded by adults’ questioning and piecemeal in nature (Fivush & Nelson, 2004; Nelson & 
Fivush, 2004), these findings suggest that at this age range, children can do more than simply 
think about the locations of events in repeated event sequences, meaning that their temporal 
cognition differs fundamentally from that of younger children.  
However, we believe that there may still be important limitations in children’s grasp 
of temporal concepts at this stage. As can be seen in Figure 1(b), our suggestion is that 
children of this age may still be thinking about events rather than points in time even when 
considering things that have happened outside the immediate past or present. Moreover, we 
have characterized them as not having a linear notion of time that would allow them to 
systematically represent the before-and-after relations between events. And because children 
are assumed not to be representing the same domain of times as mature thinkers, we do not 
assume that they have full-blown concepts of the past and future either. Children of this age 
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use tense appropriately, indicating that they draw an important distinction between two 
categories of events. However, what is at issue is whether these two categories map on to the 
notions of past and future as they are usually understood. In our model, we suggest that 
although children of this age draw a clear distinction between past and future events, it need 
only be assumed that they think of these events as having different statuses, rather than 
occurring on different parts of a time line that centres on the present. It is because of this that 
we still consider thought about time to be event-dependent at this age.  
We pointed out in Section 1.3 that in adults’ everyday understanding of time, past and 
future are thought of as asymmetrical, and that part of this asymmetry is that things the past 
are unalterable, whereas things in the future are yet to be decided. Our suggestion is that 
children’s earliest grasp of the difference between the past and future may consist primarily 
in them categorizing past and future events differently, i.e., they think of facts about past 
events as unalterable and facts about future events as (at least potentially) alterable, and it is 
this sense that the events fall into two different categories. Using these two categories 
appropriately is very important – for example, so as not to miss out on the opportunity to 
change things that still can be changed by dwelling too much on things that can no longer be 
changed – but in itself falls short of fully grasping the distinction between past and future 
times. The suggestions is that children may operate with this categorical distinction between 
events without having a linear, unified, event-independent notion of time.  
In suggesting these limitations in 2- to 3-year-olds’ notion of time, one key 
consideration is whether children have any grasp of how temporally distant events are related 
to each other. What is undoubtedly true is that children of this age can sometimes provide 
temporally ordered descriptions of an event sequence that has occurred in the past. For 
example, Nelson (1996) provides the narrative of 2-year-old Emily who describes a past 
event as follows “My sleep. Mommy came. And Mommy ‘get up get up time go home.’ 
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When my slep [sic] . . . Time to go home. Drink p-water [Perrier]. Yesterday did that. Now 
Emmy sleeping in regular bed”; for other examples from Emily, see Gerhardt (1989). Emily 
seems to have a temporally structured representation for an event sequence that happened 
previously, so she knows when individual components of that event sequence happened 
relative to each other.  However, as discussed above, a mature linear and unified notion of 
time allows for more than this: it is underpinned by a grasp of the fact that systematic 
relations exist between any two points in time, even between entirely unrelated events. As 
mentioned above, these systematic relations have an important property, namely that of 
transitivity. What we are suggesting is that there is currently no convincing evidence that 2- 
to 3-year-olds can think about temporal relations in this way.  
One challenge to how we have characterized the temporal abilities of children of this 
age, particularly in terms of assuming that they can only think of time in an event-dependent 
way, might be thought to come from psycholinguistic studies. Children aged 2 to 3 years 
learn to use temporal adverbs, such as “now”, “already”, “later”, “when” and “soon” (Weist, 
2014; Weist & Buczowska 1987; Weist & Zevenbergen, 2008). They will also use terms such 
as “yesterday” and “tomorrow” (Pawlak, Oehlrich, & Weist, 2006; Weist & Buczowska 
1987), although not necessarily accurately. One important issue is whether this indicates that 
children are using these terms to single out points in time per se, rather than events. If they 
were, this would suggest that they are not event-dependent in their temporal thinking in the 
way that we have argued. One way to put this point would be to say that children using these 
terms may be introducing a temporal context in which to describe events, and thus that they 
are not simply describing the events themselves.  
While we agree that the use of these types of terms signals that children’s abilities go 
well beyond those captured in Stage (a), we believe that does not tell us whether children are 
actually picking out an event-independent point in time. That is, what these adverbs mean for 
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children when they first start using them might potentially actually be cashed out purely with 
reference to events themselves, rather than with reference to times as such. So, for example, 
“later” could potentially mean “once certain events have finished”, and “when” might always 
mean “simultaneous with a certain event” rather than “at the point in time at which”, and so 
on. In other words, children may be introducing an event context rather than a temporal 
context. Nelson (1996) argues for this sort of interpretation of early use of temporal adverbs 
stating that “[T]he child uses knowledge of event structure as a framework for acquiring and 
eventually interpreting words coding temporal relations…” (p. 286). Here, what she means is 
that children learn to use these words in the context of their event representations, and it is 
only later that the terms acquire their full meaning. She suggests that even terms such as 
“yesterday” or “tomorrow” might initially only be understood in relation to certain events, 
rather than understood as referring to periods of time in the past and future.  
Children’s limitations also become clearer by considering that there is no evidence 
that children of this age are capable of the sort of temporal perspective-taking that we 
described in detail in Section 1.3. That is, children may indeed categorize some facts about 
events as unalterable and some as (at least potentially) alterable [Stage (b)], but may not yet 
be capable of the sort of temporal perspective-taking that a mature notion of time allows. As 
far as we are aware, there is no evidence to suggest that children of this age can appreciate 
that the status of events as unalterable or alterable changes systematically as time passes, and 
that at different points in time facts about events that were once alterable became no longer 
so. That is, we do not believe that children of this age are capable of the sort of flexible 
thinking about time that is underpinned by a linear and unidirectional notion of time.  We 
argued in Section 1.3 that such an ability is a hallmark of a mature notion of time, not only 
because it involves representing the domain of times as linear and unidirectional, but because 
it involves representing times in an event-independent way. Thinking of a past event as “once 
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potentially alterable” involves a grasp of the fact that the time the event occurred could have 
been filled with different possible events; i.e., it involves being able to think about points of 
time independently of the events that occupy those points in time. Although children of this 
age are able to talk about some events in the past and future, can use tensed forms 
appropriately, and use some temporal adverbs, we would argue that this is not sufficient 
evidence of the understanding we have described.  
2.3 Stage (c): Linear event-independent time (4-5 years) 
In our model, we are suggesting that sometime around 4 to 5 years, there is an 
important shift in how children can think about time, when children start to represent time in 
a linear and unified way, and become capable of event-independent thought about times. 
Children now grasp that there are systematic relations between points in time and realize that 
as time unfolds things due to happen in the future will become present and then move to the 
past.  
One good reason for assuming that children of this age start to grasp the relations 
between times comes from studies that ask children about the temporal relations between 
different events that happened at quite distinct points in time and were not part of a connected 
sequence. For example, Friedman (1991) showed that 4-year-olds can judge the relative order 
of two unrelated events that occurred in their schools 6 weeks apart (a lesson on tooth 
brushing and a demo of how video cameras work). A number of other studies have also 
shown that 4- and 5-year-olds make some judgments about the order of unrelated events over 
extended time periods (Friedman, 2000; Friedman & Kemp, 1998; Friedman, Gardener, & 
Zubin, 1995; Hudson & Mayhew, 2011; McCormack & Hanley, 2011), although children 
find it easier to order past than future events (Busby-Grant & Suddendorf, 2009; McCormack 
& Hanley, 2011). Some of these studies used a time line procedure whereby children had to 
place events at locations on a line stretching back into the past or forward into the future, and 
24 
 
although children of this age are not perfect at this task, their above-chance performance 
suggests that they understood this format (Friedman & Kemp, 1998; Hudson & Mayhew, 
2011; though see Droit-Volet & Coull, 2015).  
A recent study by Tillman, Marghetis, Barner, and Srinivasan (2017) provided the 
most extensive study to date of children’s ability to use such a time line. In their study, 
children were shown a horizontal line, with a vertical line in the middle that marked “right 
now”, and were asked to mark in the locations of some past (e.g., eating breakfast that 
morning) and future events (their next birthday), as well as some locations corresponding to 
deictic time words (such as yesterday or next week). By 4 to 5 years, but not before, children 
were able to appropriately place locations in the side of the time line representing the past 
versus the future, and they also were above chance in ordering the locations appropriately on 
the time line (e.g., that “yesterday” is before “this morning”). Notably, the ability to 
appropriately locate times in the past versus the future was closely linked to the ability to 
order locations in time, suggesting that children of this age have developed a coherent linear 
and unidirectional representation of the domain of time that underpinned both abilities. In 
summary, findings from a number of different studies including the recent one by Tillman et 
al. (2017) indicate that, at this age, children understand something important about the 
relations between points in time, 
We have also suggested that event independent thought about time might be closely 
linked to counterfactual thought, because thinking counterfactually about a past event 
indicates that children understand that there is a distinction between the point in time at 
which an event occurred and the event itself (i.e., something different could have happened, 
because the point in time at which the event occurred was once in the future and hence still 
potentially alterable). In fact, there is considerable disagreement amongst cognitive 
developmental psychologists over when children can think counterfactually (Beck & Riggs, 
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2014; Rafetseder & Perner, 2014). Much of this debate hinges on whether children may be 
able to answer some types of counterfactual questions without actually engaging in 
counterfactual thought (Beck, 2016; Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010; Rafetseder, 
Schwitalla, & Perner, 2013).  
Beck, Robinson, Carroll and Apperly’s (2006) study examined children’s ability to 
think about both future possibility and counterfactual possibility in a novel way. In their task, 
children watched as a toy mouse was dropped down into a chute that branched off into two 
sides. Beck et al. asked children a specific type of counterfactual question: children were 
asked, after the mouse had fallen down one branch of the chute, whether it could have gone 
anywhere else (a so-called open counterfactual question). Three- to four-year-olds had 
difficulties answering this question, but 5- to 6-year-olds were able to do so. Beck et al. (p. 
424) suggest that answering correctly requires that “one appreciates that there was a point in 
time when either the actual or counterfactual event could have happened”. Furthermore, in 
order to assess the idea that children would consider that different possible outcomes could 
occur in the future, before dropping the mouse they asked children to put cotton wool mats 
out to catch it. Children could either put a single mat out or two mats, one for each branch of 
the chute. Beck et al. argued that if children understood that there could be more than one 
possible outcome, they should put out mats under both branches. Three- and four-year-olds 
typically put out only a single mat, and it was not until children were around 5 years old that 
they were likely to put out two mats. Given the findings of both these tasks, Beck et al. 
conclude that it is not until around 5 years that children can think both about the future and 
about the present as locations in time at which multiple possible events could occur or have 
occurred. These findings are consistent with the sort of shift in children’s understanding of 
time that we have outlined here.  
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Being able to think about time in an event-independent way is also important for 
everyday activities such as some types of planning. Typically, when one is planning, one 
thinks about not just which actions one might engage in, but also the order in which one 
should engage in them. One may mentally shuffle these actions about or replace them with 
other actions in order to try to figure out what the optimal sequence would be. Thus, just as 
planning a spatial layout may involve an object-independent way of thinking about space – 
e.g., mentally moving furniture around so that the table goes there and the lamp goes here – 
so planning may typically involve an event-independent way of thinking about time in which 
one mentally moves around events to figure out how to obtain the outcome one wants. In 
their review paper of the research on young children’s planning, McCormack and Atance 
(2011) have argued that there are distinctive developmental changes in children’s ability to 
plan for the future that occur around 4 to 5 years. In particular, children start to be able to 
plan on a variety of different tasks that have in common the requirement to be able to flexibly 
reason about the temporal relations between steps in a sequence of actions, mentally trying 
out different possible actions at different steps (e.g., Gauvain & Rogoff, 1989; Kaller, Rahm, 
Spreer, Mader, & Unterrainer, 2008; McColgan & McCormack, 2008). 
Some of these studies can also be interpreted as involving temporal perspective-
taking. For example, in McColgan and McCormack’s (2008) study, children were told about 
a character who was visiting a zoo, and wanted to take a picture of a kangaroo. Children had 
to choose where to leave the character’s camera so that she could ensure that she had the 
camera by the time she got to the kangaroo’s cage.  Some of the locations were on the path 
before the kangaroo’s cage, and some after. One way of characterizing what children have to 
do in this task is that they have to realize that by the time the character reaches the cage, the 
event of picking up the camera, while now in the future, must be in the past, i.e., they have to 
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be able to reason appropriately about before-and-after relations between points in time and 
engage in temporal perspective-taking.  
We want to emphasize here that this requires an understanding of how causality 
operates in time. Mature thinkers understand that the passage of time leads to the unfolding of 
causally linked states of affairs: in terms of an ordered set of points of time in the past A, B, 
and C, they can think of the events at A as causally determining a certain outcome at B, and 
events at B as potentially changing that outcome, leading to a different outcome at C, and 
they grasp that these causal relations are not reversible. Elsewhere we have termed this sort of 
reasoning that involves appreciating the causal significance of temporal order as temporal-
causal reasoning (McColgan & McCormack, 2008; McCormack & Hoerl 2005, 2007). Note 
that being able to engage in this form of reasoning goes beyond being able to produce a 
sequence of causally linked actions to achieve a goal, which children can do from an early 
age. Rather, it requires a reflective ability to reason about temporal-causal relations 
themselves. 
Some studies have directly looked at young children’s ability to engage in this sort of 
reasoning about causality in time, and the general conclusion is that this ability emerges 
somewhere around 4 to 5 years. In examining this ability, it is crucial to distinguish between 
judgments that involve simply updating one’s model of the world sequentially as states of 
affairs unfold, and actually reasoning about causal relations in time. Updating can allow one 
to have a model of the world that is sensitive to how the unfolding of a sequence of events 
has impacted on how things are: it is simply a matter of changing one’s representations of 
how things are systematically as one sequentially acquires pieces of information about states 
of the world. For example, if a sequence of events A, B, and C occurs, updating simply 
involves changing one’s representation of how things are initially following A, then 
following B, and then following C. This does not involve reasoning about event order per se. 
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Temporal-causal reasoning is more sophisticated than this, because it involves actually 
reasoning about how the sequence in which events happened has yielded one outcome rather 
than another: for example, reasoning that if A happened and then B, this would have led to 
outcome X but if B happened and then A, this would have led to outcome Y. Distinguishing 
between simple updating and temporal-causal reasoning is not straightforward: it involves 
decoupling the order in which children find out about events from the order in which the 
events actually happen, because if children find out about events in the same order in which 
they actually happen they could well use updating to correctly judge the current state of the 
world. 
The first study to use this approach was that of Povinelli, Landry, Theall, Clark, and 
Castille (1999). These authors showed children two video clips of a toy being hidden in a box 
behind their back while they had been playing a game (i.e., children had not seen the hiding 
events when they occurred). In each video, the child was playing a different game, and the 
toy was being hidden in a different one of two boxes. The children were shown the two 
videos together, after they had played both games, but crucially some children were shown 
the clips in a different temporal order from the one in which two filmed episodes had actually 
occurred. Thus, those children had to use their knowledge about the order in which they had 
played the two games to reason that the toy was now in the location shown in the first video 
they saw rather than in the second video. It was not until children were 5 that they were able 
to do this.  
Two subsequent studies by McCormack and Hoerl (2005, 2007) also decoupled the 
order in which children found out about events from actual event order, but did not use a 
video clip method. In one study (McCormack & Hoerl, 2007), children were told that two 
boy dolls always acted in a specific order. The boys then went into a room in a dolls’ house 
that had a red cupboard and a blue cupboard and the door was closed so that children could 
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not see the subsequent events. The experimenter narrated to children what was happening, 
which was that the doll who always went first put a hairbrush in one cupboard (without 
naming the color), and the other doll got the hairbrush out and put it in a different cupboard. 
The door to the room was then opened, and the dolls were standing beside the cupboards that 
they had put the hairbrush in. Children had to use their knowledge about the order in which 
the dolls acted in order to figure out where the hairbrush was. As in Povinelli et al.’s (1997) 
study, it was not until children were around 5 years that they could do this. Using a different 
procedure, McCormack and Hoerl (2005) found a similar pattern of age effects. 
Interestingly, another context in which the order in which children find out about 
events differs from actual event order is in the context of some types of sentence 
constructions involving the terms “before” and “after”. These terms allow the speaker to 
decouple order in exactly this way: for example, in the sentence “Before the girl took off her 
hat, she took off her coat.”, the taking off of the hat happens after the taking off of the coat 
but is mentioned first. A number of studies have suggested that 3- to 4-year-olds tend to use 
an order-of-mention strategy to understand sentences involving “before” and “after”, 
meaning that they will typically have difficulty with sentences in which order of mention 
does not match event order (Blything, Davies, & Cain, 2015; French & Brown, 1977; 
McCormack & Hanley, 2011; Trosborg, 1982). One possibility is that children’s ability to 
understand such non-chronological sentences is primarily constrained by their working 
memory skills (Blything et al., 2015), because of the need to mentally manipulate the 
sentence content. Alternatively, it could be that young children’s comprehension difficulties 
are part of a larger problem in reasoning about event order. One piece of evidence in favor of 
the latter possibility is that children’s comprehension on such non-chronological sentences is 
correlated with performance on tasks that involve making judgments or reasoning about event 
order (McCormack & Hanley, 2011).  
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Taken together, these findings suggest that at around 4 to 5 years children are able to 
reason in a new way about how causality operates in time. However, there are only a limited 
number of studies that have looked at this issue and moreover they have all looked at 
children’s reasoning about just two events that occurred over a relatively short time scale of a 
few seconds to minutes. We believe there is considerable scope to look in more detail at 
young children’s understanding of how causality operates in time, and perhaps to examine 
how this may be linked to other achievements we have mentioned in this section, such as 
children’s planning abilities, their ability to think counterfactually, their comprehension of 
temporal terms such as “before” and “after” and their ability to make judgments about the 
order of unrelated temporally distant events. More generally, developmental studies have not 
directly addressed when children first understand that facts about events in the past are 
unalterable but that facts about what will happen in the future are potentially alterable 
(though see Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2010) – which we suggest children may grasp at 
Stage (b) – or addressed when children grasp that what is alterable and non-alterable changes 
as one moves through time and differs from different temporal perspectives, which we 
suggest is a further developmental achievement.  
2.3 Stage (d) Abstract time (> 5 years) 
 We have put in a final stage in our model, which is a stage at which time is assumed 
to be understood in a completely event-independent way. We are less confident that this 
constitutes an entirely new stage in children’s comprehension of time, but we include this 
stage to capture the idea that once children master the conventional clock and calendar 
system, they have a way of describing and thinking about times that makes no reference to 
events at all.3 We suspect that until children have some mastery of such a system, they will 
                                                          
3 Clocks and calendars are calibrated by natural events (and historical ones determine what 
counts as ‘year zero’) but they arguably provide those who use them with a way of thinking 
about times without having to think about those events. 
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inevitably think of times in a way that involves at least considering the events located at those 
times, even if children can distinguish mentally been an event and its time of occurrence. 
Moreover, it is likely that learning this system makes the nature of time itself more 
transparent:  as Campbell (2006) argues “When the introduction of a calendar and clock 
system makes linearity explicit, this is a bold, simple stroke that clarifies our thinking about 
time.” (p. 11). The clock and calendar system provides a powerful new way of singling out 
temporal locations, and part of its power lies in the fact that it captures both repeated cycles 
(days, weeks, and years) and particular unique times. Clearly, mastery of this system is only 
achieved within the context of extensive socialization and typically as a result of direct 
teaching. Nevertheless, once children acquire this system arguably they possess a way of 
thinking about time that they did not have before. 
In fact, full mastery of a clock and calendar system is a very slow developmental 
achievement (e.g., Friedman, 1977, 1986; 1991, 2000; for reviews see Friedman, 1982, 1989; 
McCormack, 2015). Although by age 6 to 7, children can often report on what day of the 
week it is and can list the seasons in correct order (Friedman, 1977, 1982, 1986, 1991), they 
can struggle with the cyclical aspect of the system (for example, although they recognize that 
spring-summer-autumn-winter is the correct order, they may have difficulty judging that 
autumn-winter-spring-summer is also a correct order). Children of 8 to 10 will typically have 
learnt the correct order of the months of the year, but still have less flexibility than adults in 
how they make use of the system, and can struggle to make judgments about, for example, 
which annual holiday or month comes next from the perspective of a different point in the 
year (Friedman, 1986, 2000). In fact, Friedman (1982, 1986, 1989) has argued that there is a 
qualitative shift in adolescence in how conventional time is represented. His argument is that 
children’s difficulties using the system flexibly stem from the fact that they initially represent 
only verbal lists of days and months, which are intrinsically directional and thus cause 
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difficulties when making flexible judgments (e.g., those that involve thinking 
retrospectively). He suggests that it is only in adolescence that individuals start to use 
spatialized mental images of conventional time that support more flexible judgments.  
3. Explaining Developmental Change 
As yet, we have said nothing about the nature of the developmental process, and in 
particular we have not made any claims about how children move from stage to stage. 
Moreover, we have not considered how the changes in the notion of time described here 
might be related to any changes in children’s acquisition of a concept of duration – the 
question raised at the start of this paper. There is very little in the way of empirical evidence 
that can help us address either of these issues, but in this final section we make some remarks 
about them.  
3.1 Developmental change, language, and social interaction 
 To what extent are children’s emerging notions of time dependent on social 
experience and on language acquisition in particular? Historically, the idea that linguistic 
experience shapes the conceptualization of time has been a well-known and controversial 
one, not least because of Whorf’s influential analysis of time in Hopi language. Clearly, the 
conventional systems for measuring time and locating events in time are culturally specific 
and are only acquired by children as a result of extensive direct teaching. We take the more 
difficult issue to be whether acquiring the more basic notions of time that we have 
highlighted in Stages (a)-(c) of our model is dependent on language and social experience. 
The most extensive discussion of this issue is provided by Nelson (1996). She argues that 
through their own experiences, children come to represent familiar event sequences. 
However, notions of time are only implicit in these representations, and it is only through 
acquisition of language that these implicit notions become explicit. Moreover, she claims that 
children’s first uses of temporal terms and language are bound up with their event 
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representations and as a result do not have the same meaning as those of adults; it is only 
gradually through shared discourse with adults about events that children acquire mature 
temporal notions. Notably, she believes that this is true not only with regard to the acquisition 
of conventional time systems (such as the clock and calendar system), but also with regard to 
more fundamental aspects of a notion of time, including the distinction between past, present, 
and future: “[L]anguage may make salient a type of relation that was not previously apparent 
in the child’s non-linguistic conceptual representations. Present evidence suggests that this 
may be the case for the tense system, bringing out the distinction between past, present, and 
future. Prior to acquiring this system children may distinguish only between the now and the 
not-now, or attend only to action relations in the here and how, the living present. In this 
case, the relation that must be expressed grammatically attunes the child to a relation to 
which she had previously been indifferent” (p. 289).  
The central difficulty in assessing this argument empirically, and other claims about 
the role of language and social experience in children’s acquisition of temporal concepts, is 
that is extremely difficult to know what sort of concept children have of time without 
examining their speech or using tasks that require language. Thus, it is difficult if not 
impossible to contrast what children understand about time before they acquire language with 
their subsequent understanding. Empirical evidence to support suggestions such as Nelson’s 
takes the form of trying to establish that when children first use (in this instance) tense, they 
do not seem to use it to mark the same distinctions as adults; this is then interpreted as 
indicating that they initially lack the distinction between past, present, and future that 
underpins the adult use of the tensed system. Indeed, we considered some evidence of this 
sort in Section 2.2.  
While we do not necessarily agree with all aspects of Nelson’s (1996) account, we 
suspect that she may be correct in assuming that acquiring fundamental temporal notions may 
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be something that hinges on acquiring language and engaging in shared discourse. Elsewhere, 
we have argued that engaging in shared reminiscence about the past (and shared discussion 
about the future) with adults may be critical in children acquiring a linear, unidirectional 
notion of time that is underpinned by a grasp of how causation operates in time (Hoerl, 2007; 
Hoerl & McCormack, 2005; McCormack, 2015; see also Welch-Ross, 2001). The suggestion 
is that when parents and caregivers engage in talk about events at other times with children, 
they are essentially scaffolding children to begin to take different temporal perspectives on 
events. For example, by adopting a different temporal perspective on an event that is now in 
the past, parents can help children understand that the very same event once had not yet 
unfolded and was still in the future. Similarly, it can illustrate how what did happen was both 
constrained by what had happened previously and also determined by what choices were 
made at the time. In this way, children may start to understand the causal connections 
between events located at different points in time. While there is little empirical evidence to 
directly support the idea that such interactions are critical for acquisition of children’s notion 
of time, there is good evidence to indicate that these interactions support the development of 
children’s ability to form their own coherent and structured narratives about their personal 
past and future and to use temporal terms appropriately (Hudson, 2006; Nelson & Fivush, 
2004).  
3.2 A single process or multiple ones? 
Finally, we began this article by distinguishing between two ways in which time 
features in people’s mental lives – time as a dimension of things that unfold in time and time 
as a framework within which such things can be located – and have focused on the 
development of the second of these ways. Once children have mastered the clock and 
calendar system, we can be confident that they have integrated both of these aspects of the 
concept of time. However, we do not know whether these really are separable aspects of a 
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concept of time that develop independently, and, if they are separable, how this integration is 
achieved. One possibility is that these are acquired in entirely separate developmental 
processes, and they become properly integrated only when children start to learn the clock 
and calendar system. The alternative is that their acquisition depends on some of the same 
cognitive achievements and socio-cultural experiences. There is no empirical evidence that 
we are aware of that would help us decide between these alternatives.  
We note, though, that whilst this paper has in particularly focused on the question of 
the emergence of a capacity for event-independent thought in the context of children’s 
understanding of time as a framework, there is an important parallel issue regarding 
children’s understanding of time as a dimension, namely when children begin to think of 
duration in an event-independent way. That is, when can children think of a period of time as 
quantifiable, independent of whatever events actually occur during that time period? Indeed, 
answering this question is part of what the Piagetian research attempted to do, although by 
the questionable method of looking at when duration judgments were unaffected by other 
stimulus dimensions. Perhaps a better way to try to answer this question may be to look at 
when children begin to count in order to measure time intervals, which could be interpreted 
as evidence that they understand that duration is quantifiable. Although children often do not 
count spontaneously before around 8 years (Pouthas, Paindorge, & Jacquet, 1995; Wilkening, 
Levin, & Druyan,1987), children as young as 5 can be encouraged to count and it improves 
the accuracy of their duration judgments (Clement & Droit-Volet, 2006).  
Other studies have shown that by the time children are 5 they can use some sort of 
metric to make judgments about the durations of events. Friedman (1990) showed that 5-
year-olds can use a rudimentary scale involving sand-timers of different sizes in order to 
make judgments of the durations of every day events, suggesting that they have a way of 
thinking about duration – i.e., a single metric – that is uniform across different event types. 
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More recently, Tillman and Barner (2015) asked children to make judgments about the 
relative durations of familiar events by indicating on a time line how long they thought the 
events lasted for, with one end of the time line being described as very short and the other 
end as very long. Using this technique, 5-year-olds were able to make some discriminations 
in this way between familiar events of different durations, even though they showed poor 
knowledge of the durations of periods of time described using time words associated with the 
conventional clock and calendar system (seconds, minutes, hours and days). Indeed, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, a proper grasp of the durations of periods of time corresponding to 
conventional time words seems to be closely linked to children’s numerical skills, and 
continues to develop over middle childhood (Labrell, Mikaeloff, Perdry, & Dellatolas, 2016).    
Further research by Droit-Volet using a quite different technique also sheds light on 
the issue of when children have a concept of duration. Rattat and Droit-Volet (1999) trained 
3- and 5-year-olds to make a cartoon picture appear by pressing a rubber squeezer for 5s; 
children of both age groups were able to learn to do this, consistent with other studies 
suggesting that 3-year-olds can appropriately adjust their actions to demonstrate sensitivity to 
event duration (Droit-Volet & Coull, 2016; Rattat & Droit-Volet, 2007). They then used a 
transfer task in which children had to perform a different action but of the same duration of 
5s in order to see the cartoon picture. They found that while 5-year-olds were able to transfer 
knowledge about appropriate duration to a different action, 3-year-olds were unable to do so. 
They argued that this suggests that by 5 years (but not before) children can not only time their 
actions appropriately, but they also have a concept of duration that is sufficiently abstracted 
from the specific events filling a duration to allow them to succeed on the transfer test.    
Taken together, these studies suggest that by 5 years, children have some concept of 
duration that is event-independent, i.e., that they understand that events last for a certain 
amount of time, and that even for periods filled with different types of events it is possible to 
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compare the amount of time that they take. Rattat and Droit-Volet (2007, p. 282) refer to this 
as a concept of “homogeneous time abstracted from events”. We note that the age in question 
(around 5 years) is around the same age as we suggest children reach Stage (c) of our model, 
i.e., when they begin to think about the domain of time in which events can be located in an 
event-independent way. Both conceptual achievements – being able to represent the domain 
of time in a linear, event-independent way, and possessing a concept of duration – pave the 
way for children to begin to acquire knowledge of the clock and calendar system, although 
this learning process takes a long time for children to complete.  
As we stated above, there is little empirical evidence that allows us to judge whether 
acquiring these two notions of time depends on separable processes. However, we note that 
there is a hint from Tillman et al.’s (2017) recent study of children’s understanding of deictic 
terms that while 4- to 5-year-olds can represent time as a linear domain of ordered locations, 
they may not yet properly integrate this with knowledge about the lengths of periods of time. 
Children of this age were able to appropriately order temporal locations on a time line 
relative to each other (e.g., place “yesterday” to the right of “last year” or “next week” to the 
left of “next year”), but their placements suggested they were much poorer at judging the 
relative durations of the period of time between the event and the current moment in time 
(e.g., that “next year” is considerably farther from the present than “tomorrow”). This 
suggests that while they may have some grasp of the ordering of times in the past and future, 
they find it hard to put this together with information about how much time there is between 
the present and these other times. Clearly, these findings address primarily children’s 
understanding of temporal terms (some of which are associated with the conventional 
calendar system, and a proper grasp of which must require numerical skills), so it is difficult 
to judge to what extent this reflects conceptual difficulties. A promising line of 
psycholinguistic research, though, would be to examine relations between children’s 
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understanding of temporal terms referring to duration and children’s understanding of deictic 
temporal terms.  
4. Concluding remarks 
We have proposed a stage-like developmental model of the acquisition of temporal 
concepts, but, as we acknowledge above, this model is still speculative. As we have pointed 
out, there is as yet no agreed set of experimental tasks used to study children’s temporal 
concepts. In proposing our model we have drawn in part on existing literature in 
psycholinguistics, much of which has looked at children’s spontaneous use of tensed or 
temporal language. While this is indeed a rich source of data, we suspect that until there are 
established empirical paradigms testing the specific aspects of children’s understanding of 
time that we have detailed in this paper, this area of cognitive development will remain 
relatively neglected. And part of the difficulty in coming up with such paradigms lies in 
designing tasks that do not simply test children’s understanding of language itself.  
We have focused in this paper on children’s emerging understanding of time as a 
domain in which events can be located, but we have also mentioned the importance of 
studying children’s acquisition of the concept of duration. In looking across both aspects of 
temporal cognition (time as a dimension, time as framework), what needs to develop is an 
event-independent way of thinking about time. This is the central developmental 
achievement, and, as we have argued, it is one that is likely to happen in degrees.  
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Figure 1 (see attached file) 
A summary of the developmental model. At Stage (a), representations are of repeated event 
sequences (as indicated by the circle) and time is not linear. At Stage (b), representations are 
still of events rather than of times per se, and there is no linear organization. At Stage (c), 
times are represented and organized linearly underpinned by an understanding of how 
causation operates in time. At Stage (d), time is represented in a fully abstract and event-
independent way. # 
